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Preliminary
Abstract
Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for
games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to-
check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria. How-
ever, the second and intuitively more demanding extension, iterative essential dominance, is shown to be
an equilibrium refinement. The latter result includes Moulin’s (1979) classic theorem as a special case
when all players’ payoffs are real-valued. Therefore, essential dominance solvability can be a useful
solution concept for making sharper predictions in multicriteria games that feature a plethora of equi-
libria.
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1 Introduction
This paper is concernedwith dominance solvability in gameswhere the players’ payoffs
are generally multidimensional, or vector-valued. Allowing for suchmultidimensional-
ity is intuitive and in principle desirable, but generally comes at the cost of diminished
analytical tractability relative to the standard case where payoffs are captured by real
numbers. Despite this added degree of complexity, however, recent examples suggest
that the analysis of such games can be fruitful in economically relevant settings (Bade,
2005; Lejano and Ingram, 2012).
Themodelling approachwe adopt in this paper builds on the assumption that, when-
ever vector-valued, all payoffs are ordered by the usual (Pareto) partial ordering. The
assumption is obviously suitable when all players’ preferences do actually coincide
with this particular partial ordering and this fact is commonly known, but its relevance
is not limited to this special case. When some players’ preferences involve a scalariza-
tion of their vector payoffs and this fact is privately known by these players, the game
could obviously be modelled as one of incomplete information by introducing a type
for each possible scalarization that each player might employ and common beliefs over
the distribution of these types. However, in the present setting, the minimal rationality
requirement that “weakly more in every dimension and strictly more in some dimen-
sion is strictly better” provides a salient benchmark for the players’ beliefs about each
other’s preferences. Consequently, one can imagine the players responding to type un-
certainty by adhering to this benchmark or focal point, and playing the game as if all
players’ preferences coincided with this partial ordering, irrespective of what their own
true preferences actually are.
When games with vector payoffs are analysed by assuming that payoffs are partially
ordered in the above sense, a difficulty that one expects to generally arise more fre-
quently compared to games with scalar payoffs is multiplicity of (a suitably generalized
notion of) equilibria. Our main motivation for studying dominance solvability in this
class of games is to provide an equilibrium refinement that is analogous to the notion
of sophisticated equilibrium introduced in Moulin (1979, 1986) for standard scalar-payoff
games, and thereby help alleviate this problem by eliminating generalized equilibria in
which some player’s strategy is (iteratively) dominated.
In the present setting, a player’s strategy A is said to weakly dominate B if A yields
a weakly better payoff (i.e. with weakly more in every dimension) for every opponent
profile and a strictly better payoff (i.e. withweaklymore in every dimension and strictly
more in some) for some opponent profile. This is the straightforward but very restrictive
extension of conventional weak dominance in higher dimensions. In response to this
restrictiveness, we introduce two intuitive generalizations of this concept that are con-
siderably more permissive. First, strategy A is said to partially dominate B if there is no
opponent profile where B results in a better payoff than A and there is some opponent
profile where A yields a strictly better payoff than B. Moreover, A is said to essentially
dominate B if there is no linear completion of the player’s payoffs according to which
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B weakly dominates A in the conventional sense, and there is some such completion
under which A weakly dominates B.
Partial and essential dominance are logically distinct and motivate different notions
of dominance solvability, both of which generalize the one proposed in Moulin (1979).
With regard to our main questions concerning whether the solution set of a game that
is dominance solvable according to either notion is a subset of the game’s generalized
equilibria or not, it is shown that the answer is yes for iterative essential dominance but,
perhaps surprisingly, no for iterative partial dominance. It is also shown, however, that
when an easily testable restriction is added to the requirements of partial dominance,
this suffices for the latter to imply essential dominance and hence for this discrepancy
to disappear.
2 Multicriteria Games and Generalized Equilibrium
A multicriteria game is a collection (Si, vi)
I
i=1, where Si is player i’s pure strategy set,
S = ∏Ii=1 Si, and vi : S → R
ni , ni ≥ 1, is player i’s payoff function. For s, s
′ ∈ S, we
write
vi(s) ≥ vi(s
′), if v
j
i(s) ≥ v
j
i(s
′) for all j ≤ ni
vi(s) > vi(s
′), if vi(s) ≥ vi(s
′) and vi(s) 6= vi(s
′)
For the two reasons laid out in the introduction, it will be assumed throughout that all
players payoffs are ordered in this way, and that this fact is common knowledge.
A strategy profile s ∈ S is a pure strategy generalized Nash equilibrium if, for all
i ≤ I,
vi(s
′
i, s−i) ≯ vi(si, s−i) (1)
for all s′i ∈ Si. If s is a generalized equilibrium, then a unilateral deviation by some
player will result in a loss for that player in at least one payoff dimension. When ni = 1
for all i this definition reduces to that of ordinary pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The
generalization goes back to Shapley (1959).1
3 Partial Dominance and Non-Equilibrium Solutions
Given a multicriteria game (Si, vi)
I
i=1, a strategy s
′
i weakly dominates another strategy
si if
vi(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ vi(si, s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i
&
vi(s
′
i, s−i) > vi(si, s−i) for some s−i ∈ S−i
(2)
1Voorneveld, Vermeulen, and Borm (1999) and Voorneveld, Grahn, and Dufwenberg (2000) refer to this concept as Pareto equi-
librium instead.
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If ni = 1, then the above obviously coincides with the standard definition of weak
dominance. If ni > 1, then (2) provides the straightforward extension of the concept
in higher payoff dimensions. This extension, however, is obviously very restrictive
and not very likely to be applicable in games of economic relevance. We will therefore
consider more permissive notions of dominance, starting with the following:
Definition 1. A strategy s′i partially dominates another strategy si if
vi(si, s−i) ≯ vi(s
′
i, s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i
&
vi(s
′
i, s−i) > vi(si, s−i) for some s−i ∈ S−i
(3)
In words, s′i partially dominates si if for no opponents’ choices does si result in a
higher payoff than s′i, while for some opponents’ choices s
′
i results in a higher payoff
than si. Partial dominance clearly generalizes weak dominance when ni > 1, while it
reduces to it when ni = 1.
For S′ ⊆ S, let P(S′) ⊆ S′ denote the set of all strategy profiles that obtain after every
partially dominated strategy has been removed from S′ by every player. Also, write
Pi(S
′) for the set of player i’s strategies in S′i that are not partially dominated.
Definition 2. A finite multicriteria game (Si, vi)
I
i=1 is partially dominance solvable if there
exist S1, S2, . . . , Sk such that S = S1, Sj+1 = P(Sj) for all j ≤ k − 1, P(Sk) = Sk, and for
every player i, vi(s) 6≶ vi(s
′) for all s, s′ ∈ Sk.
Partial dominance solvability generalizes standard dominance solvability a` laMoulin
(1979), both in terms of the dominance criterion employed and also in terms of what
constitutes a solution set. Like Moulin (1979), the dominated strategies of all play-
ers are eliminated in each round. As is well known, if this condition is not imposed
whenweakly dominated strategies in standard games with scalar payoffs are iteratively
deleted, the solution ultimately obtained will depend on the order of elimination. Un-
likeMoulin (1979), the players’ payoff functions at the solution set are not required to be
constant. Intuitively, when payoffs are scalar-valued, the players’ indifference between
two strategies conditional on an opponent strategy profile is captured by equality of
their payoffs. When the latter are multidimensional, the partial dominance solution
concept essentially expands the notion of indifference to vector equality or incomparabil-
ity. Thus, the requirement that each player must be indifferent between any two profiles
at the solution set translates into the requirement that their payoffs be either equal in-
comparable according to the vector dominance relation.
Although straightforward to formulate and not particularly demanding on the play-
ers from a computational point of view, the following normative drawback is associated
with iterative partial dominance.
Observation 1. The solution set of a partially dominance solvable finite multicriteria game may
not include any generalized Nash equilibria.
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To illustrate, consider the following game:
a b c d
U (2, 3),
(
1
1
)
(2, 5),
(
3
3
)
(2, 5),
(
3
1
)
(3, 5),
(
3
2
)
M (2, 4),
(
3
2
)
(5, 3),
(
3
1
)
(4, 4),
(
2
3
)
(3, 4),
(
3
2
)
D (2, 2),
(
3
3
)
(3, 5),
(
2
3
)
(3, 4),
(
3
2
)
(4, 3),
(
2
3
)
The pure strategy equilibria in this game are (M, a) and (M, c). In the first round of
elimination, M dominates D and d dominates c. In the second round, d dominates a.
In the third round, U dominates M, while in the final round, b dominates d. Thus, the
unique partial dominance solution is (U, b). At this profile, the row player profitably
deviates to D.
A logically distinct extension of weak dominance is introduced in the next section
that motivates a solution concept which on the one hand is strong enough to restore the
relationship between generalized dominance solutions and equilibria and on the other
hand remains permissive enough to relax weak dominance.
4 Essential Dominance and Sophisticated Equilibria
The following definition is key in what follows:
Definition 3. Given a vector-valued function vi : S → R
ni , a function ui : S → R is a
completion of vi if there exists a vector α ∈ R
ni
++ such that ∑
ni
i=1 αi = 1 and, for all s ∈ S,
ui(s) =
ni
∑
j=1
αjv
j
i(s). (4)
The motivation for requiring the vector α of scalarization weights in the above defi-
nition to be an element of R
ni
++ and not merely of R
ni
+ comes from noting that if a player
was willing to scalarize his payoffs in such a way that αj = 0 was true for some j ≤ ni,
then the j-th payoff dimension would be considered redundant for that player, and
therefore his payoff dimensionality would have to be decreased in proportion to the
number of such irrelevant dimensions. However, all players’ true payoff dimensional-
ities are assumed to be common knowledge in the game. Hence, for this assumption
to remain conceptually compatible with the one that allows players to scalarize their
payoffs, the weights must be assumed strictly positive.
Definition 4. A strategy s′i essentially dominates another strategy si if s
′
i is not weakly
dominated by si under any completion of player i’s payoffs and s
′
i weakly dominates si under
some such completion.
As with the concept of partial dominance, the player here is portrayed as employ-
ing two criteria before considering one strategy to dominate another. The first criterion
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(undomination under all completions) must be satisfied universally, while the second
(dominance under some completion) only partially. Unlike that concept, however, in
which the criteria were defined in terms of the vector dominance relation, here the
player is assumed to engage in a considerablymore demanding computational task that
involves comparing his strategies by weak dominance relative to all possible scalarized
payoff values these may be associated with.
Although partial and essential dominance are logically distinct, it is shown next that
the former implies the latter once a structural condition on the player’s payoffs is satis-
fied.
Observation 2. A strategy s′i essentially dominates another strategy si if s
′
i partially dominates
si and, for each j ≤ ni,
sgn
(
v
j
i(s
′
i, s−i)− v
j
i(si, s−i)
)
= sgn
(
v
j
i(s
′
i, s
′
−i)− v
j
i(si, s
′
−i)
)
(5)
for all s−i, s
′
−i.
Indeed, suppose s′i partially dominates si and (5) also holds. Since, by assumption,
vi(s
′
i, s−i) > vi(si, s−i) for some s−i ∈ S−i, there is no completion ûi of vi under which si
weakly dominates s′i. Now let
v̂
j
i := mins−i∈S−i
(
v
j
i(s
′
i, s−i)− v
j
i(si, s−i)
)
.
Without loss of generality, suppose
v̂1i ≤ . . . ≤ v̂
ni
i .
If v̂1i ≥ 0, then v̂
j
i ≥ 0 for all j ≤ ni, which implies that s
′
i dominates si in the stronger
sense of (2). Now suppose v̂
j
i < 0 for some j < ni. Since (5) holds and s
′
i partially
dominates si, it follows that v̂
k
i > 0 for some k, where j < k ≤ ni. Let ui := α1v
1
i + . . .+
αniv
ni
i be a completion of vi. Since vi(s
′
i, s−i) > vi(si, s−i) for some s−i ∈ S−i, for s
′
i to
weakly dominate si under ui it suffices to choose the αjs so that ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i) ≥
0 for all s−i ∈ S−i. Since v̂
ni
i > 0 and v̂
ni
i ≥ v̂
j
i for all j ≤ ni, this is achieved by choosing
αni to be sufficiently close to 1.
The restriction imposed by (5) in relation to strategies s′i and si is that as the oppo-
nents’ strategies change, there can be no reversal in the dominance direction for any
fixed payoff dimension of player i associated with playing si or s
′
i. For example, if s
′
i is
better than si in the first payoff dimension and worse in the second when the opponents
play s−i, then the condition states that neither of these relations can be strictly reversed
when the opponents play any other s′−i.
The converse implication in Proposition 2 is not true in general. Indeed, consider the
following example:
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a b c
U (3, 1), · (5, 3), · (3, 5), ·
D (1, 2), · (3, 5), · (5, 3), ·
Here,U does not partially dominate nor is it partially dominated by D, and (5) also fails.
Clearly, however, under the row player’s completion with weight α1 = 0.5, U weakly
dominates D, whereas for no α1 ∈ (0, 1) does D weakly dominate U.
Now, for S′ ⊆ S, let E(S′) ⊆ S′ denote the set of all strategy profiles that come about
after every essentially dominated strategy has been removed from S′ by every player,
and define Ei(S
′) as the set of player i’s strategies that are essentially undominated in
S′.
Definition 5. A finite multicriteria game (Si, vi)
I
i=1 is essentially dominance solvable if
there exist S1, S2, . . . , Sk such that S = S1, Sj+1 = E(Sj) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, E(Sk) =
Sk, and for every player i, vi(s) 6≶ vi(s
′) for all s, s′ ∈ Sk.
Essential dominance solvability allows for different completions to be employed by
the same player across different rounds of elimination. It is worth stressing, however,
that what is implicitly assumed to be common knowledge in the game is the general de-
cision rule by which players choose strategies.2 As such, the solution concept implicitly
requires all players to carry out all computations necessary for checking if any of their
own as well as their opponents’ strategies are iteratively essentially dominated. Thus,
all possible completions by all players are assumed to be checked in this process, and
this is done consistently across all rounds of elimination.
The solution set associated with an essentially dominance solvable game with strat-
egy profile set S will be denoted De(S), while its set of pure strategy generalized Nash
equilibria will be denoted N(S).
Proposition 1. If a finite multicriteria game (Si, vi)
I
i=1 is essentially dominance solvable, then
De(S) ⊆ N(S).
This result includes Moulin’s (1979) Proposition 1 as a special case when all players’
payoffs are scalar-valued. Also, in view of this result, Observation 2 with its easy-to-
check condition (5) is informative as to how far partial dominance solvability is from
being an equilibrium refinement as well. In the spirit of Moulin (1986), in those essen-
tially dominance solvable games where the solution set is a proper subset of the game’s
set of equilibria, one may refer to those selected by the proposed solution concept as
sophisticated generalized equilibria.
Putting iterated essential dominance at work in the example of the previous section,
one notes that in the first round M essentially dominates U and D and that c is domi-
nated by d. In the second round, b is dominated by a and d. The surviving profiles are
2We abstract from an analysis of the epistemic conditions for either partial or essential dominance solvability. For the state of the
art concerning such conditions for iterated admissibility in the standard case of real-valued payoffs the reader is referred to Dekel,
Friedenberg, and Siniscalchi (2014) and references therein.
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therefore (M, a) and (M, d). However, the game is not essentially dominance solvable
because v1(M, d) > v1(M, a).
Now consider the following slightly modified version of this game (the new payoffs
for the row player at (U, a) and (U, d) are (3, 2) and (3, 3), respectively). As before, the
game’s equilibria are (M, a) and (M, c).
a b c d
U (2, 3),
(
3
2
)
(2, 5),
(
3
3
)
(2, 5),
(
3
1
)
(3, 5),
(
3
2
)
M (2, 4),
(
3
2
)
(5, 3),
(
3
1
)
(4, 4),
(
2
3
)
(3, 4),
(
3
2
)
D (2, 2),
(
3
3
)
(3, 5),
(
2
3
)
(3, 4),
(
3
2
)
(4, 3),
(
2
3
)
U and D are essentially dominated by M in the first round, but now c and d are domi-
nated by a as well. In the second round, b is dominated by a, which leads to (M, a) as
the unique sophisticated equilibrium.
5 Concluding Remarks
The analysis of multicriteria games can be complicated by the presence of a possibly
large number of equilibria. To mitigate this multiplicity, strong assumptions about the
players’ knowledge (e.g. on how they scalarize their vector payoffs) may need to be
employed. In this paper we showed that even when the analysis is restricted to the
original vector-payoff formulation of the game, sharper predictions than those based
on equilibrium alone can in principle still be made in such games when the proposed
notion of iterative essential dominance is employed as the relevant solution concept.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Following Moulin (1979), it will first be shown that for any Ŝ ⊆ S,
N(E(Ŝ)) ⊆ N(Ŝ).
Assume to the contrary that there is s ∈ Ŝ such that s ∈ N(E(Ŝ)) and s 6∈ N(Ŝ). Then,
for some player i and strategy s′i ∈ Ŝi \ E(Ŝi) it holds that
vi(s
′
i, s−i) > vi(si, s−i). (6)
This implies that, for every completion ui of vi,
ui(s
′
i, s−i) > ui(si, s−i). (7)
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Indeed, let ui be an arbitrary completion of vi. Then, for some α ∈ R
ni
++ such that
∑
ni
j=1 αj = 1, ui(s) = ∑
ni
j=1 αjv
j
i(s) for all s ∈ Ŝ. From (6), v
j
i(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ v
j
i(si, s−i) for all
j ≤ ni and v
j
i(s
′
i, s−i) > v
j
i(si, s−i) for some j. The latter and the fact that αj > 0 for all j
establishes the claim.
In view of s′i 6∈ E(Ŝi), there exists s
′′
i ∈ E(Ŝi) that essentially dominates s
′
i. This
implies that, for some completion ui of vi, ui(s
′′
i , s−i) ≥ ui(s
′
i, s−i) for all s−i ∈ Ŝ−i and,
in particular,
ui(s
′′
i , s−i) ≥ ui(s
′
i, s−i). (8)
From (7) and (8), we get ui(s
′′
i , s−i) > ui(si, s−i). In view of s
′′
i ∈ E(Ŝ), this contradicts
the postulate s ∈ N(E(Ŝ)).
Since the game is essentially dominance solvable, there exist S1, . . . , Sk such that S =
S1, Sj+1 = E(Sj) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, and E(Sk) = Sk. Since N(E(S′)) ⊆ N(S′) for
all S′ ⊆ S and Sj+1 = E(Sj), it follows that
N(S) = N(S1) ⊇ N(S2) ⊇ . . . ⊇ N(Sk). (9)
Thus, De(S) = Sk = E(Sk) = N(E(Sk)) ⊆ N(S). 
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